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Attorney liable for
bad title opinion
despite warranty
In Avco Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Ramsey,
631 So.2d 940 (Ala. 1994), the Su-
preme Court of Alabama held that a
lender may recover damages from an
attorney who pursuant to a title search,
issued a warranty deed guaranteeing
property with an outstanding mortgage
as being free and clear of encumbrances.
Additionally, the supreme court deter-
mined that the lender was not required
to proceed against the property's grantor
for breach of warranty of title prior to
seeking a judgment against the attor-
ney.
A Faulty Title Opinion and Bankrupt
Debtors
In 1990, Fred and Rosemarie
Kilcrease applied for a loan from Avco
Financial Services, Incorporated. Part
of the Kilcreases' loan was to be se-
cured by Alabama real estate which
they had received from Mrs. Kilcrease' s
mother. Avco retained attorney Richard
H. Ramsey IV to perform a title search
and issue a title opinion regarding any
existing encumbrances on the property
from Mrs. Kilcrease's mother. Ramsey
concluded that the property was free
and clear of encumbrances. Relying on
Ramsey's title opinion, Avco approved
a $16,000 loan to the Kilcreases, and
issued what it believed to be a first
mortgage on their property as a security
for the loan.
The Kilcreases paid Avco on their
loan monthly for approximately one
year. After a year, they defaulted on
their mortgage. Subsequently, Avco
received notice that the Kilcreases had
filed a bankruptcy petition. Avco first
learned about the existence of a prior
mortgage on the Kilcreases' property
during the Kilcreases' bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. The first mortgage was ex-
ecuted by Mrs. Kilcrease's mother to
First Alabama Bank in 1989. This prior
mortgage encumbered Avco's creditors'
rights in bankruptcy against the
Kilcreases. As a result, Avco filed suit
against Ramsey pursuant to the Ala-
bama Legal Services Liability Act, Ala.
Code Section 6-5-570 (1975), seeking
damages for harm proximately result-
ing from his failure to discover and
disclose the pre-existing mortgage on
the Kilcreases' property.
Trial Court Finds Avco Failed to
Mitigate Damages
The trial court determined that
Ramsey did not act in accordance with
legal professional standards when he
neglected to disclose the pre-existing
mortgage on the Kilcreases' property.
Additionally, the court found that Avco
relied on Ramsey's title opinion in its
decision to render the Kilcreases a loan.
Nonetheless, the court entered a judg-
ment against Avco, holding that Avco
failed to mitigate damages. Thus, the
trial court prevented Avco from collect-
ing damages against Ramsey.
The trial court based its decision on
an expert conclusion that Avco could
have stopped bankruptcy proceedings
against the Kilcreases and foreclosed
on the second mortgage on their prop-
erty. The expert also testified that the
deed from Mrs. Kilcrease's mother to
the Kilcreases guaranteed title of the
property against any mortgage not listed
on its face. Thus, the deed's failure to
disclose a first mortgage to First Ala-
bama Bank constituted a breach of war-
ranty. The expert further maintained
that foreclosure by Avco on the prop-
erty would invest in Avco the right to
sue Mrs. Kilcrease's mother for breach
of warranty.
Avco subsequently appealed the trial
court's decision to the Supreme Court
of Alabama.
The Duty to Mitigate Damages
The Supreme Court of Alabama be-
gan its analysis of the trial court's opin-
ion by stating that all parties who seek
damages from another possess a duty to
mitigate their losses. However, the rule
of mitigation applies only if a court can
infer from the evidence presented that a
claimant failed to act as an ordinarily
prudent person would have acted under
similar circumstances to minimize her
losses.
The supreme court next outlined the
criteria for evaluating whether a claim-
ant has complied with her duty to miti-
gate damages. First, an injured party
must take all reasonable steps to reduce
loss. Second, when evidence presented
is susceptible to conflicting interpreta-
tions, a court deciding whether a claim-
ant has complied with her duties to
mitigate must base its holding on the
facts of the case before it. Finally, the
rule of mitigation does not apply in the
absence of substantial evidence sup-
porting an inference that the claimant
could have decreased her damages
through reasonable efforts and expense
and without undue risk.
Based on its evaluation of the duty to
mitigate, the Alabama Supreme Court
unanimously agreed with Avco's con-
tention that the trial court erroneously
utilized this three-step mitigation analy-
sis in the case at bar. The supreme court
found that the evidence presented at
trial did not support an inference that
Avco could have decreased its damages
through reasonable efforts and expense,
and without undue risk.
Mitigation Against Mortgagees Not
Prerequisite for Action Against Title
Guarantor
According to the trial court's appli-
cation of the three-step mitigation analy-
sis, Avco should have done the follow-
ing to mitigate its damages: halt the
Kilcreases' bankruptcy proceeding;
foreclose on the Kilcreases' second
mortgage; and proceed against Mrs.
Kilcrease's mother for breach of war-
ranty of title. The Alabama Supreme
Court questioned the legal propriety of
these mitigation possibilities. Further-
more, the supreme court found that even
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if the mitigation options were legally
proper, the trial court's conclusion that
Avco possessed a duty to mitigate its
damages against the Kilcreases consti-
tuted an unreasonable prerequisite to
Avco's right to sue Ramsey for his
faulty title opinion.
Additionally, the supreme court ex-
plained that the three mitigation options
offered by the trial court were incom-
plete, risky, time-consuming, and ex-
pensive. The court concluded that "(t)he
law of mitigation does not impose upon
the damaged party the duty to expend
good money to chase the bad; nor does
it impose upon the damaged party the
duty to first exhaust all other remedies."
Accordingly, the Alabama Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's deci-
sion, finding in favor of Avco.
-Judith Gorske
Uninsured motorist
coverage notice
held satisfactory
In Breithaupt v. USAA Property and
Casualty Ins. Co., 867 P.2d 402 (Nev.
1994), the Supreme Court of Nevada
held that USAA Property and Casualty
Insurance Company (USAA) provided
customers with satisfactory written no-
tice regarding the availability of unin-
sured motorist coverage. In so doing,
the court refused to overrule legal pre-
cedent imposing a greater duty of notice
on the insurer. The court also declined
to apply retroactive disclosure laws upon
insurers because such measures would
not improve consumer awareness of the
benefits of purchasing optional unin-
sured/underinsured motorist coverage.
The Notice Requirement
On April 4,1988, BarbaraBreithaupt
suffered severe and permanent injuries
in an automobile accident. While she
recovered the maximum amount from
the other driver's insurance company,
this amount did not fully compensate
for her injuries. Breithaupt carried un-
insured/underinsured motorist (UM)
coverage with USAA in the amount of
$15,000 per person and $30,000 per
accident for both of her vehicles. She
also carried bodily injury coverage of
$300,000 per person and $500,000 per
accident. In order to provide Briethaupt
with maximum coverage, USAA al-
lowed her to stack the UM coverage on
her two vehicles and paid her $30,000,
the full amount of her UM coverage.
Breithaupt filed suit against USAA
under a Nevada statute, NRS
687B.145(2), seeking reformation of
her automobile insurance contract. She
alleged that USAA failed to comply
with pre-1990 statutory language re-
quiring the insurer to notify its custom-
ers that they could purchase UM cover-
age equal to the limits of bodily injury
coverage. In dispute was USAA's in-
surance renewal notice that included a
flyer describing both the nature of UM
coverage and the minimum coverage
which an uninsured motorist was re-
quired to purchase by law. The flyer
contained a section entitled: "Higher
limits are available." The higher limits
section discussed factors that an insured
should consider in determining the ap-
propriate amount of coverage to pur-
chase. The notice also stated:
"If you want to increase your UM
coverage, give us your order on the
order form on the back of this folder.
Available limits are listed in the box to
the right.
"IMPORTANT: The UM policy lim-
its you select may not exceed the Bodily
Injury (BI) liability limits in your policy.
If you want to increase your UM to a
limit higher than your present BI, please
use the order form on the back to in-
crease your BI liability limit."
To the right of this statement, USAA
listed "UM Limits Available." The list
included UM coverage of $300,000 and
$500,000.
Breithaupt contended that the insur-
ance renewal notice failed to satisfy the
notification requirement under the Ne-
vada statute because it was unclear and
ambiguous. She claimed that as a result
of these deficiencies, the court should
reform her contract with USAA to al-
low the UM limits of the policy to equal
the limits for bodily injury. Under a
reformed contract, USAA would pro-
vide Breithaupt with UM coverage of
$300,000 per person for each of her two
vehicles. Stacking this coverage would
entitle Breithaupt to $600,000 of UM
coverage, allowing her to recover an
additional $570,000 for damages sus-
tained in her accident.
The trial court granted summary judg-
ment for USAA, holding that the con-
tract should not be reformed because
the written notice satisfied the state law
requirements. Breithaupt then appealed
to the Nevada Supreme Court.
Court Finds Full Disclosure of UM
Coverage
The Supreme Court of Nevada re-
jected Breithaupt's contention that the
insurance renewal notice was unclear,
ambiguous, and did not satisfy statutory
requirements. It agreed that USAA could
have made a clearer affirmative state-
ment to Breithaupt that UM coverage
equaling her bodily injury coverage was
available. However, the court found that
the notice was sufficient to inform "the
average layman who is untrained in the
law or the field of insurance" that UM
coverage equal to bodily injury cover-
age was available.
In addressing the issue of notifica-
tion, the court examined the language of
the pre-1990 version of the applicable
state law. In relevant part, the statute
provided that insurers "must offer unin-
sured motorist coverage equal to the
limits of bodily injury coverage sold to
the individual policyholder." The court
acknowledged that "must offer" was
susceptible to a variety of interpreta-
tions, each imposing a different duty of
notice upon the insurer. In its discus-
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